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Britain's EU presidency 
The six-month British presidency of 
the European Union ended on 30 June 
1998. CllR's MILENA PIRES assesses 
the achievements and limitations 
of the British EU presidency's actions 
on East Timor and stresses the need 
for follow-up. 
In relation to East Tim or, the British presidency will be bestrememberedfora three-dayvisitto 
the territory by three EU ambassadors in June 
1998 (see Timar Link44,August 1998) . The full 
· reportofthevisithasnotbeen made public, but 
the conclusions have been released and they 
contain the strongest position the European 
Union has ever taken formally. 
The report recognises the importance of 
bringing the East Timorese directly into the 
peace process; it calls for a ceasefire; and it calls 
on the Indonesian government to withdraw 
troops from East Timor. It also urges the inter-
national community to be more active and to 
provide more support for dialogue and the 
maintainance of stability. However, the 
conclusions stop short of a firm EU commitment 
to achieve any of these things. 
Peacekeeping role 
For a ceasefire to succeed, the international 
community must put in place a UN peace-
keeping force to provide safety and stability for 
all the Timorese. The international community 
must also step up the political pressure on the 
Indonesian government to withdraw its military 
presence and release all Timorese political 
prisoners. 
In CIIR's view, the British government needs 
to press the European Union to go further than 
the action recommended in the report, by 
supporting a referendum, as called for by the 
East Timorese pro-independence movement. 
This should give options on independence, 
integration and association with another state 
and would provide a means for the East Timorese 
to exercise their right to self-determination. 
AttheUNCHR 
Earlier this year, at the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, the British government, on 
behalf of the European Union, negotiated a 
last-minute consensual statement, much weaker 
than the draft resolution it had promised to 
support. Foreign office officials have attempted 
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to justify this by claiming that a process of 
engagement is more useful than yet another 
condemnation of Indonesia. 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) has informed CUR that one recommen-
dation in the consensual statement, the visit to 
East Timor of the UN Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention, is due to be implemented 
towards the end of the year. However, public 
pressure must be maintained to ensure that the 
visit actually takes place. Indonesia has ignored or 
obstructed similar agreements in the past, for 
example, the visit by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on Torture which was agreed to in 1996. 
Further action 
Many initiatives undertaken by the British 
presidency require further action. Some of these 
are the responsibility of the current-Austrian 
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- presidencY. for example, some aspects of the 
implementation of the Troika \isit recommen-
dations. Howeyer others, such as the UN Human 
Rights Commission consensual statement, are 
clear)\' the responsibility of the British authori ties. 
\ leanwhile, developmenL~ in the talks between 
Portugal and Indonesia, under the auspices of 
the l' N secretan -general, are moving fas t. As a 
direct result of agreements reached during the 
last round of tripartite talks, Portugal , Indonesia 
and the UN are discussing autonomy models. 
T here is Yery strong East Timorese opinion 
again st thi s. The European Union and its 
member states, including Britain, must monitor 
these developments and act to ensure that the 
East Timorese are able to exercise their right to 
A framework for political autonomy 
President Habibie's offer of autonomy for 
East Timor deserves serious consideration, 
argues MICHAEL SALLA of the American 
University's School of International Service. 
The resignation of President Suharto has 
I ushered in a period of reform never seen 
before in Indonesia. The new administration 
under President Habibie is making genuine 
efforts to make the Indonesian political and 
economic syste m more representa tive, 
transparent and accountable. The government, 
the armed forces (ABRI) and the Indonesian 
public are also beginning to re-evaluate ABRI's 
proper role in politicsandsocietymoregenerally. 
Pres ident Habibie has abandon ed fo rmer 
President Suharto's position that no special 
status is needed for East Timor. Habibie has 
offered as a solution to the conflict a wide degree 
of political autonomy, provided the EastTimorese 
accept Indonesian sovereignty. 
The political momentum created by Suharto's 
resignation , the impact on Indonesia of Asia's 
finan cial crisis , and the important change in 
Indonesia's position on East Timor has led to 
optimism that the East Timor problem will soon 
be se ttl ed. Many in th e East Timorese 
community are hoping that the decolonisation 
process halted by Indonesia 's invasion will 
eventually be resumed under UN auspices and 
that the East Timorese will exercise their inter-
nationally recognised right to self-determina-
tion through a referendum . And the upsurge 
of pro-indepe ndence demonstrations in Dili 
after Suharto 's resignation indicates that in a 
referendum , the majority, given the option , 
would probably rnte for independence. 
The main proble m with thi s optim istic 
scenario is that it underestimates Indonesia's 
capacit\' and reso_b:e to hold on to the territory. 
\Vhile East Timor does drain development funds 
from the Indonesian central gm·ernment, which 
can ill afford it in the current financial crisis, 
Indonesia is sufficiently large and powerful to 
maintain its military presence in East Timor. 
The Indonesian armed forces' extensive financial 
holdings in East Timor and, more importantly, 
the oil being ex tracted from ample reserves in 
the Timor Gap, considerably offset the cost of 
that military presence. -
ABRl's determination 
The backbone of the determination to hold on 
to East Timor comes from ABRI. Whil e the 
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generation of officers who rose to prominence 
partly owing to military service in East Timor is 
retiring, strong sentiment remains within ABRI 
as an institution that East Timor should not be 
allowed to leave Indonesia. The argumentABRI 
uses most often is that Indonesia would disinte-
grate if East Timorbecame a precedent for other 
regions, for example IrianJaya (West Papua) , 
Aceh, and so on. 
Such an argument is weak, since East Timor 
has an international status these other regions 
simply d; not enjoy, and was never part of the 
Dutch East Indies. The real problem for ABRI is 
one of institutional identity. ABRI has invested 
much ofits prestige in East Timor and the present 
generation will not let the territory slip away, 
thereby dishonouring the memory of respected 
former superiors who still wield influence behind 
the scenes. Also, to let East Tim or go would be to 
admit tacitly that Indonesian military interven-
tion in the territory was wrong. This would cast an 
unwelcome light on those responsible for making 
the decision to intervene. 
ABRI is also sensitive to the general evaluation 
of its traditional role in Indonesian society now 
taking place, which will almost certainly reduce its 
political influence. Letting East Timor go would 
be seen as further undermining ABRI's status. 
Direct talks 
Indonesia has the capacity and resolve to hold on 
to East Timor despite the present era of political 
and economic reform, and the current financial 
crisis. Nevertheless, the olive branch of political 
autonomy that has been extended towards the 
East Timorese needs serious consideration. The 
gesture opens up a erofound political dilemma 
for the East Timorese community. So far, the 
consensus has been that any solution will come 
through the dialogue between Portugal and 
Indonesia being conducted under UN auspices. 
From the perspective of the East Timorese 
diaspora, and many within the territory, Portugal 
represents the interests of the East Timorese. 
This made direct negotiations between East 
Timorese political leaders and Indonesia 
unnecessary and also unlikely, given the political 
differences that would emerge between 
externally based East Timorese parties if such 
negotiations were ever begun. 
Despite Portugal ' s genuine attempt to 
represent East Timorese interests, it is home to 
a large diaspora that does not want to 
compromise its long held position on East 
self-determination. 
According to FCO officials , however, the 
British government's scope for action is limited 
because its position is to follow the lead of the 
United Nations. It is therefore not the FCO's 
process to run. An ethical foreign policy would 
suggest a more proacti\'e approach on East 
Timor. 
Tim or. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, 
for Portugal to stand for anything less than a 
resumption of decolonisation under UN 
auspices. Political autonomy is thus viewed as a 
compromise that Portugal is unwilling and 
unable to make given the expectations of its 
political constituency. However, the present era 
of reform has put into question Timorese 
reluctance to engage in direct discussions with 
Indonesia. 
Tradeoffs 
What form would political autonomy take if it 
was to offer a solution to the East Timor conflict? 
Political autonomy is a power-sharing 
arrangement where a regional or local 
government shares or divides with a central 
government a range of governmental powers. 
Political autonomy solutions typically have 
legislative and executive bodies at the regional 
level similar to the state governments in federal 
systems such as those of the United States, 
Australia and Canada. 
In the case of East Timor, political autonomy 
would probably mean that the Indonesian 
government maintains control over defence, 
foreign affairs and currency, while a regional 
government would control most other areas. A 
police force controlled by an East Timorese 
regional government, and most probably made 
up of Timorese, would ensure law and order. 
An autonomous East Timor, however, would 
still remain part of a sovereign Indonesia. There 
are therefore a range of political tradeoffs that 
both sides would have to make if political 
autonomy were to be accepted as a solution. 
Recent cases of conflicts where political 
autonomy was adopted as a solution - for 
example, Northern Ireland and Palestine - are 
characterised by intense debate that has led to 
strong divisions emerging and violent opposition 
to the agreement. A political autonomy solution 
for East Timor would probably lead to similar 
debates and possible opposition. 
Among those East Tirnorese agreeing to 
political autonomy would be some who see it as 
a 'victory' on the road to the final goal of inde-
pendence. At the same time, there would be 
those in the Indonesian government who would 
view it as a 'victory' since Indonesian sovereignty 
would have been accepted. This is an important 
ingredient of a political autonomy arrangement 
created to settle a conflict. Both sides can simul-
taneously claim the solution as a 'victory', thereby 
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defusing criticism from more extreme factions 
of their respective political constituencies that 
do not want to compromise. 
While it remams to be seen what shape any 
political autonomy agreement for East Tim or 
would take, it is worth exploring what might be 
its key ingredients. A series of workshops held 
at the American and Uppsala universities over 
1997-98 explored a range of political autonomy 
solutions. East Timorese participants have 
formed an East Timor Stud Group that is 
currently developing a detaile political 
autonomy framework. Among the principles 
the Study Group proposed are four which I 
believe could underpin a political autonomy 
solution that enables both sides to claim the 
necessary 'victory'. These principles are the 
following: 
• the East Timorese regional government 
would have powers of legislation and 
implementation in all areas other than 
defence, foreign affairs and currency; 
• a consensual 'review' of both the 
agreement and its implementation after a 
specified period of time; 
• a jointly appointed independent body that 
would arbitrate disputes between the East 
Timorese regional government and the 
central government; 
• a referendum on the agreement where by 
those residing in East Timor would have 
the simple choice of either accepting or 
rejecting the agreement. 
The last principle, concerning a referendum, 
would be crucial for legitimising the 
agreement among the East Timorese and 
internationally. 
A solution to the East Timor conflict based 
on political autonomy offers a means to alleviate 
repression, poverty and instability for those still 
residing in East Timor. The price to be paid 
for this, however, is acceptance oflndonesian 
sovereignty. This dilemma posed by the 
Indonesian government's new flexibility is 
gradually being brought to light by the inability 
• ·-. 
of Portugal to change its basic bargaining 
position over East Timor. For the first time in 
the conflict, the East Timorese community 
faces the challenge of finding consensus in 
order to play a direct role in settling the conflict. 
Much remains to be done to make all parties 
involved in the East Timor conflict aware of 
the advantages of a political autonomy solution 
based on principles such as those described 
above. The East Timor Study Group is presently 
pursuing this task. If proper and immediate 
attention is given to addressing the desperation 
of many still resident in East Timor, I am 
confident that a negotiated settlement to the 
conflict can soon emerge. 
Professor Michael Salta is working on a special 
autonomy project of the Peace and Conflict 
Resolution Programme, School of International 
Seroice, American University. 
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EAST TIMOR: Time for change 
Tim.or, area 7,400 square miles, is one of the 
easternmost islands· of the Indonesian 
archipelago and lies 300 miles north of 
Australia, its nearest neighbour. The western 
part of the island, formerly a Dutch colony, 
belongs to Indonesia, whereas East Timor was 
for more than 400 years a Portuguese colony. 
In 1974 Portugal began decolonising East 
Timor. Newly formed political parties 
discussed options for the future. The 
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT) initially 
favoured federation with Portugal but then 
formed a coalition with Fretilin, the 
nationalist liberation movement, to demand 
independence. A small third party, Apodeti, 
was used as a vehicle for Indonesian 
propaganda in favour of integration. 
On 11August1975 the UDT staged a coup 
to pre-empt Indonesian threats to intervene 
if Fretilin came to power. In the ensuing civil 
war 1,500 people lost their lives. By September 
1975, however, Fretilin was in control of 
virtually all of Portuguese Tim.or, following 
the defection of Timorese colonial troops to 
the liberation movement's side. 
Indonesia, like the United States, was 
worried by the proximity of an independent 
state with radical policies and continued to 
threaten East Timor, despite previous 
assurances that Jakarta would respect the right 
of the East Timorese to independence. In 
September 1975 Indonesia closed West Tim.or 
to journalists and on 7 December it laWlched 
a full-5cale invasion of East Tim.or with the 
knowledge of the United States and the 
encomagement of Australia. After a fraudulent 
'act of self-determination' in May 1976, East 
Tim.or was declared to be Indonesia's '27th 
Province' in July 1976. The United Nations 
regards the annexation as illegal. 
The invasion and annexation of East Tim.or 
has been bmtal: up to 200,000 people, a third 
of the population, have died as a result of 
Indonesian rule. But the majority ofTIDlorese 
have not accepted subjugation: Indonesia has 
been unable to eliminate the desire of the East 
Timorese for self-determinatlon and an anned 
resistance movement still remains in the hills. 
Although the invasion has been condemned 
by successive UN resolutions, the international 
community has done little or nothing to 
implement them, given the major economic 
and geopolitical interests of the United States, 
Japan and particularly Australia in the region. 
Indonesia's crucial strategic location and 
regional status - it has the world's fifth largest 
population, and large reserves of oil and other 
natural resources - have all encouraged the 
world to downplay East Tim.or's agony. 
In recent years, however, several events 
have combined to break East Tim.or's isolation 
and bring its continued occupation to inter-
national attention. In 1989 the Pope visited 
the territory and in 1991 the planned visit of a 
parliamentary delegation from Portugal, still 
considered the administering authority of East 
Tim.or by the UN, created huge expectations 
of change. To great disappointment in East 
Tim.or, the delegation was forced in October 
1991 to call off its visit. 
On 12 November 1991 Indonesian troops 
shot and killed up to 300 East Timorese 
civilians chning a funeral procession held at the 
Santa Cruz cemetery in Dill, the East Timorese 
capital, for a victim of repression. Witnessed 
by foreign journalists, the Santa Cruz massacre 
provided indisputable evidence of Indonesian 
atrocities. 
The Santa Cruz massacre has forced 
governments around the world to criticise 
Indonesia's brutality, injecting new impetus 
into diplomatic efforts to bring about a 
solution to East Tun.or's suffering. Since 1983 
the UN secretary-general has been entrusted 
with the achievement of a settlement to the 
dispute; and with the post-Cold War era 
providing a new international climate for nego-
tiations, Indonesia faces increased pressure 
to reach a solution with Portugal and the East 
Timorese Wlder the auspices of the UN. 
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Aceh's special status 
In an attempt to persuade the world that 
East Timor will be treated magnanimously 
as the Republic of Indonesia's 27th 
province, the Habibie regime has offered 
the Timorese special status. Reference is 
often made to the special status granted to 
Aceh, a province on the northern tip of 
Sumatra, as the model. CARMEL 
BUDIARDJO of TAPOL explains what this 
status meant for the people of Aceh. 
Special status was granted to Aceh in 1957 to fend off a Muslim rebellion that had raged in 
the province for years. The Acehnesewere allowed 
to take con u-ol of three areas: religion, customary 
law and education. This ended the rebellion but 
in the mid 1970s, a new rebellion erupted, this 
time under the Free Ac eh Movement or GAM. By 
this time Aceh, which is very rich in natural 
resources, was being extensively exploited. It had 
already become a key source of foreign exchange 
for Jakarta, accounting for more than I 0 percent 
ofbudgetreceipts. Hardly any of this was ploughed 
back into the province. 
Apart from a brief period in 1949-50 when 
th e Republic had a federal constitution, 
Indonesia has always been a strongly centralised 
state. After military rule was established in 1965, 
centralisation became even more oppressive and 
Aceh 's special status became totally meaningless. 
But a new kind of special status was to emerge in 
1989 when the CAM rebellion erupted for a 
second time after a period of inactivity. 
Low-intensity conflict 
With CAM enjoying widespread support in the 
countryside in north and eastAceh and in Pidie 
district, the Indonesian army resorted to a 
campaign of unparalleled brutality that 
continued relentlessly for the next decade. In 
desperation at the fai lure of the regular troops 
to suppress CAM, the army designated Aceh a 
mili tary operational region or DOM (daerah 
opemsi militer) under which combat troops with 
special intelligence capabilities were brought in 
to deal with the insurgency. Aceh became a 
classic example of low-intensity conflict as the 
wav to quell real or perceived support for the 
rebels. The troops were mostly from Kopassus, 
the elite corps, who waged a campaign of terror 
against the Acehnese. 
Although DOM was never mentioned at the 
time outside Aceh, it became the dominant 
feature oflife for the people. It can be compared 
to the special military status of East Timor, where 
a special milital)' command called Kolakops was 
put in charge. Even after Kolakops was 
disbanded, East Timor has continued to be a 
military project. 
As in East Timor, the DOM forces in Aceh, 
primarily Kopassus, were a law unto themselves. 
Thev established their own local command posts 
knmrn as SA TIS, for satusan tugas strategic dan 
taktis (strategic and tactical task force) where 
thousands of people were taken into custody, 
beaten. tortured and in many cases put to death 
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and buried in unmarked graves. Under DOM, 
the army launched a series of military campaigns 
known as 'Red-Net Operations' which continued 
until earlier this year. The primary targets were 
vi llagers accused of being GAM supporters. Civil 
servants were also caught in the 'net', as were 
academics. Dozens of people were put on trial 
but they represent a tiny fraction of the victims 
of DOM. 
The West's silence 
At the time, little was known about the terrible 
happenings in Aceh apart from reports issued in 
1992 and 1993 by Asia Watch in the United States 
and Amnesty International. TAPOL reported 
extensively in its Bulletin about events in Aceh 
over a three-year period and assisted Acehnese 
representatives abroad to make representations 
to the UN human rights commission and sub-
commission in Geneva. But the western powers 
were too busy exploiting Indonesia's natural 
resources to bother about the atrocities, of which 
they must have been well aware. 
The ousting of Suharto lifted the lid off years 
of sufferings in Aceh. The first to speak out were 
women whose husbands had disappeared, and 
who testified that they had been raped by the 
u-oops as a form of intimidation or in an attempt 
to force them to disclose the whereabou ts of 
men the military were hunting. 
Mass graves 
In the past few weeks, the locations of at least a 
dozen mass graves have been disclosed. Two 
fact-finding missions, one from the Indonesian 
Parliament and one from the National Human 
Rights Commission , have visited Aceh . They 
have been inundated by hundreds of people 
eager to testify about their own sufferings or 
about the shootings th ey saw or the torture 
centres in their neighbourhoods where the 
screams of victims were heard day and night. 
Thousands of disappearances and deaths have 
now been confirmed. The toll may eventually 
be in the tens of thousands. 
The true meaning of Aceh's special status is 
now coming to light. It has nothing to do with 
letting local people run their own affairs, but 
everything to do with incessant military 
operations aimed at bringing a reluctant region 
to heel. 
Carmel Budiardjo is the director of TAPOL, the 
Indonesia Human Rights Campaign. 
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Autonomy and the law on self -determination 
With its offer of special status for East 
Timor, the Indonesian government has at 
last conceded that the territory's status is 
not simply its internal affair. This article 
assesses the proposal in the light of UN 
law on self -determination. 
lndonesianPresidentBJHabibie's basic stance on the question of East Timor seems to justify 
the statement, by someone in an Internet 
newsgroup, that he is no more than a 'Suhar1WO'. 
In his own words or through the mouth of his 
(and Suharto's) foreign minister, Ali Alatas, he 
keeps saying, as Suharto did, that East Timor is 
an integral part of Indonesia, and that its 
annexation is irreversible. So far, nothing new. 
What is new is that Habibie and Alatas have , 
albeit unwillingly, raised the question of the 
territory's political status. They have been forced 
to do so by strengthening East Timorese 
resistance to the occupation, growing solidarity 
with the Timor cause among the Indonesian 
democratic opposition and signs that the United 
States and Western Europe are reviewing their 
position on the issue. For more than 20 years 
East Tim or was, according to the dictatorship in 
Jakarta, an internal affair of Indonesia. They 
were at most prepared to discuss the human 
rights situation there, although this did not 
mean that they were willing to improve it. 
Whenever Suharto and Alatas mentioned East 
Timor, their emphasis was on the so-called 
development Indonesia was bringing to the 
'province' . 
Weeks ago, Habibie andAlatas suddenly came 
up with a new proposal: a special autonomous 
status for the territory and the liberation of 
resistance leader Xanana Gusmao and other 
Timorese prisoners if Portugal and the United 
Nations would accept the integration of East 
Timor into Indonesia. Pure blackmail, including 
an inadmissible use of prisoners of war as 
hostages. But the fact remains that with such a 
proposal Jakarta was recognising that East Timor 
is not an 'internal affair of Indonesia' but an 
international matter and that the status of the 
territory is not as 'irreversible' as it had 
previously affirmed. Portugal refused the 
proposal - and so it should have done. Xanana 
did the same. Stating that he would not accept 
his release on such conditions, he reinforced 
his image as the 'Timorese Mandela' . 
On 4 and 5 August, during meetings in New 
York with Portuguese foreign minister Jaime 
Gama, Alatas gave up part of the blackmail. He 
agreed that the discussions on the proposed 
special status could be held without prejudice to 
basic positions of principle. But Habibie and 
Alatas kept their stance concerning Xanana. 
This must be strongly denounced. Would the 
international community have accepted that 
instead of an unconditional release of Mandela, 
de Klerk had made it subject to the world's 
acceptance of the apartheid system? 
We may, therefore, be on the eve of a new 
situation: East Tim or with 'a special status, based 
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on wide-ranging autonomy' , as th e UN 
communique on the foreign ministers' meetings 
says. The question is: autonomy as a definitive 
solution, as Habibie and Alatas view it , or 
autonomy as a first step on the way to a 
referendum , as the Timorese resistance and 
Portugal wish? Does autonomy for East Timor 
without prior consultation with the people of 
East Timor comply with the UN law on self-
determination? 
The Espiell findings 
In 1979, by mandate of the UN Commission on 
Human Rights, the Economic and Social Council 
and the Sub-Committee on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities, Hector 
Gros Espiell wrote a study on the right to self-
determination ~hich became one of the most 
important reference works on the subject. This 
isa suitable moment to recall some of the 
findings of Special Rapporteur Espiell on the 
scope and legal nature of the right of peoples 
under colonial and alien domination to self· 
determination and to apply them to the Timor 
situation. We should also bear in mind the 1976 
UN Decolonisation Report on East Timor and 
the 10 UN Security Council and General 
Assembly resolutions on the question. 
For the case ofEastTimor, the key findings of 
Espiell 's report are the following: 
The right of peoples [ ... ] to self-determina-
tion is not contingent on any kind of condition 
or requirement. In particular, resolution 1514 
(XV) precludes any opposition to the exercise 
of the right to se lf-determination on the 
pretext that a people has not reached a 
sufficient high level of development to lead an 
independent existence. 
plO, para 62 
There is no legal basis for denying the right to 
self-determination on the ground that the 
population of which a people is composed, 
or the territory which it inhabits, is small. 
p16, para 108 
These findings destroy the Indonesian 
arguments that the territory is too backward for 
independence and too small to be economical-
ly viable. 
The exercise and implementation of the right 
of peoples to self-determination presupposes 
the free and genuine expression of their will. 
[ ... ] [l]t means that the will of the people 
must be expressed through popular consul-
tation accompanied by all the safeguards 
necessary to ensure freedom of expression 
for the people concerned.[ ... ] A people under 
colonial and alien domination is unable to 
express its will freely in a consultation, 
plebiscite or referendum organised and 
controlled exclusively by the colonial and alien 
power. 
ppl0-11, para 65 
This finding d e molish es the worn-out 
Indonesian assertion that the Timorese have 
already exercised their right to self-determina-
tion through a 'decision on integration ' by a so-
called Representative Popular Assembly, an 
assembly which was convened by the occupier. 
It shows also that Habibi e's n ew proposed 
solution of autonomy without popular consul-
tation has absolutely no legal value. Only through 
a UN-supervised referendum will the Timorese 
exercise their right to self-determination . 
The right to secession from an existing State 
Member of the United Nations does not exist 
as such [ ... ] since to seek to invoke it in order 
to disrupt the national unity and the territorial 
integrity of a State would be a misapplication 
of the principle of self-<letermination contrary 
to the purposes of the United Nations Charter. 
However, [ ... ] if the national unity claimed 
and the territorial integrity invoked are merely 
legal fictions which cloak real colonial and 
alien domination, r esulting from actual 
disregard of the principle of self-determina-
tion, the subject people or peoples are entitled 
to exercise, with all the consequences thereof, 
their right to self-determination. 
p14, para 90 
Indonesia's attempt to portray the East Timorese 
resistance as a 'separatist movement' (wording 
then repeated by international media, often 
unintentionally) is therefore logical in Jakarta's 
strategy but incorrect according to international 
law. 
[ .. . ] [T]he right of peoples to self-determi-
nation necessarily implies the right of peoples 
to struggle by every means available to them, 
when the possibilities of obtaining recognition 
of the right to self-<letermination by peaceful 
means have been exhausted , against 
colonialist Powers which suppress their 
aspirations to freedom and independence. 
p14, para 93 
The struggle of peoples for their self-deter-
mination in face of colonial and alien 
domination gives rise to an international 
armed conflict and does not create a situation 
of civil war. 
p14, para 96 
In the prosecution of this struggle, the 
individuals fighting for the self-<letermination 
of their people under colonial and alien 
occupation must be protected by the rules of 
humanitarian law [ ... ]. 
p15, para 98 
It is clear that the trial ofXanana Gusmao under 
Indonesian criminal law was one more unlawful 
act of East Timor's occupying power. Xanana 
and other members of the Timorese armed 
continued on page 6 
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resistance are not criminals as Habibie and Alatas 
maintain. but p r isoners of war , and thus 
protected by the Geneva Convention relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Particularly 
at this stage, Xanana should be immediately and 
unconditionally released to enable him to 
participate in the UN-sponsored talks. 
national community and even military, financial 
and political assistance to the occupier from 
several major states, the recent positions of the 
US Senate and of the European Union about 
the holding of a referendum in East Timar are 
encouraging; if real action follows, those states 
will finally comply with the obligation mentioned 
by Espiell. 
was recently decided in Rome, comes too late 
for the crimes committed in Timar, but gives a 
strong push to that demand. 
The East Timorese can finally see light at the 
end of the tunnel. This is, however, a dangerous 
moment for all of us. Stunned by the rapidity 
of events in Indonesia, we may make mistakes, 
the first of which would be to equate the fall of 
Suharto's regime with a speedy liberation of East 
Timar. Suharto, his family and cronies may have 
lost most of their political power in Indonesia, 
but the military still rules the country and will not 
give up its prey easily. To quote Mairead Maguire 
at a conference on East Timar organised by the 
International Platform of Jurists (IPJET): 
'Between us and genuine peace, there stretches 
still a long and rocky road'. 
The international community and all States 
not onlv have a legal duty to refrain from 
opposing and impeding the exercise of the 
right to self-determination, but also are under 
a positive obligation to help in securing its 
realisation, by promoting its exercise and by 
co-operating in every possible way to ensure 
that peoples under colonial and alien 
domination achieve their independence. 
plO, para 61 
[T] hird States are not bound by the duty of 
non-intervention in the conflict, on the 
contrary there is a positive legal obligation to 
assist a people struggling against colonial 
domination. 
p15, para 97 
[H]elp, support and assistance must also be 
provided by the whole United Nations system 
of organizations. 
p15, para 103 
[The] violation of the duty to refrain from 
establishing or maintaining colonial 
domination by force is an international crime, 
precisely characterised as such, which gives 
rise to an international responsibility governed 
by a specific regime. 
p16, para 106 
Certain particularly serious criminal acts of 
individuals committed in the course of an 
activity conducted in violation of the right of 
peoples to self-determination, for the purpose 
of establishing or maintaining colonial and 
alien domination by force, should be a matter 
for international penal law [ ... ] . 
pl6, para 107 
We must therefore intensify our efforts to 
secure the self-determination of East Timar, 
using the new opportunities offered by the 
economic and political crisis in Indonesia. 
Notes 
1 The Right to Self-Determination. 
Implementation of United Nations Resolutions, 
United Nations, New York, 1980. 
After 23 years of inertia on the part of the inter-
This is not a matter of concern for later, but 
something we should already seriously consider. 
Those responsible for genocide, for crimes 
against humanity and for war crimes in East 
Timar have to answer for their deeds. The Inter-
national Criminal Court, whose establishment 
2 Decolonization, No. 7, August 1976, issue on 
East Timor, United Nations, Department 
of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and 
Decolonization, New York, 1976. 
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Angola, Guatemala, Haiti and South Africa are at various stages of transition from violent internal 
conflict to peace. 
Have the settlements ending these conflicts improved human rights? Have they helped curb impunity and 
succeeded in bringing the perpetrators of past human rights violations to justice? What impact have the 
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The Puerto Rican model 
Last year the Hostosiano National 
Congress, a Puerto Rican pro-
independence organisation, wrote 
to the Timorese resistance to share 
their experience of the status of 'Free 
Associated State'. They were responding 
to a suggestion from the late Konis 
Santana that similar status might be 
acceptable to the East Timorese. (Santana, 
head of the Timorese resistance army 
Falintil, later withdrew this suggestion.) 
Puerto Rico has been a 'Free Associated 
State', or commonwealth, of the United 
States since 1948. Under this 
arrangement, Puerto Ricans are US 
citizens and are subject to federal laws, 
but have no voting representatives in the 
US Congress. 
We reprint below the message from the 
Hostosiano National Congress. 
Warning to the people ofEastTimorfrom the people of Puerto Rico. 
Recently, it has come to our attention that a 
representative of the people of East Timor, 
presently carrying out armed struggle to attain 
independence from Indonesia, has expressed 
that a relationship with Indonesia akin to the 
'Free Associated State' situation of Puerto Rico 
with the United States would be agreeable. 
We perceive that such a response is due to 
lack of information regarding the political rela-
tionship between Puerto Rico and the United 
States. The title of 'Free Associated State' 
evidently lends itself to confusion as it may create 
the illusion that it is a compact of free association 
as defined by international law. The Hostosiano 
National Congress warns our brothers of East 
Timor to not let themselves be deceived by the 
appearance of self-determination that the title 
may convey to some members of the interna-
tional community. 
What is the Free Associated State or Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico? It is the result of 
almost 50 years of United States military rule, 
succeeded by civilian presidential appointees as 
governors, that the Congress of the United States 
allowed the people of Puerto Rico to adopt a 
constitution and elect a governor. The Consti-
Book Review 
Free East Timar, Australia's 
Culpability in East Timor's 
Genocide 
Jim Aubrey (ed), Vintage, NSW, 1998, 
296 pages. 
This collection of key documents and writings 
I exposes the Australian government's betrayal 
of East Timor. It includes an account of Ken Fry 
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tution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
was passed only by approval of the United States 
Congress, which changed its original draft 
drastically, removing Section 20. 
This section was almost a replica of the Human 
Rights Charter of the United Nations, and the 
United States Congress found it much too radical. 
All federal laws apply to Puerto Rico excepting 
those that the Congress chooses to exclude. The 
government of the United States can approve 
any legislation regarding Puerto Rico without 
consultation, although such legislation will be 
detrimental to us. 
The government of the United States controls 
the following aspects of our daily lives: the 
airspace , through the FAA [Federal Aviation 
Administration]; banking, through FDIC 
[Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation] ; com-
munication, through FCC [Federal Communi-
cations Commission] , immigration, through INS 
[Immigration and Naturalisation Service] , our 
ports, through US Customs; sea mercantile [sic] , 
defence, currency, postal [sic] , through US Postal 
Services; interstate commerce, national parks, 
through National Park Forest Services: intelli-
gence, through the FBI [Federal Bureau oflnves-
tigation], bankruptcy, intellectual properties, 
patents and trademarks, federal justice, inter-
national relations, citizenship and others. 
Despite the opposition of the representatives 
of the people of Puerto Rico presented to the 
military colonial legislative body of Puerto Rico, 
the Jones Act of 1917 was imposed, bestowing 
US citizenship upon the Puerto Ricans. Today 
the case of attorney Juan Mari Bras is pending 
before the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico due 
to his resignation of United States citizenship 
and claim of his Puerto Rican citizenship with 
all the rights inherent to a free citizen, such as 
the vote and the exercise of his profession , 
without having to hold citizenship of the United 
States in order to do so, as it has been before. 
Thousands of acres of Puerto Rican national 
land are under the control and dominion of 
the government of the US and its agencies, the 
majority of which are in the hands of different 
branches of the United States Armed Forces. 
This, despite the protest, denunciations and 
constant struggle of the people of Puerto Rico 
MP's two visits to East Timor in 1975 and the 
presentation he made to the UN General 
Assembly. The book also reproduces corre-
spondence from anonymous contacts, probably 
government officials, exposing the policy of 
Australia's foreign minister at the time, Andrew 
Peacock. 
Also included is the last article written by 
Roger East, the Australian journalist who chose 
to remain in East Tim or after all Australians had 
been advised to leave, just before the Indonesian 
invasion. East died in front of a firing squad on 
7December1975. 
The book documents the experience of East 
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against the presence of such military installa-
tions on our soil. Recently, [the US government] 
announced its plans to transfer the Southern 
Command, now at the Panama Canal , to the 
island. 
The status of the Free Associated State of 
Puerto Rico is an unequal relationship , where 
the United States Congress has the last say 
regarding changes to the rela tionship . In 
summary the Congress holds the sovereignty of 
the people of Puerto Rico, as recognised by the 
House of Representatives [in] HR 856, 
commonly known as the Young Project. 
The Constitution of the United States 
contains a clause that allows the Congress to 
manage territories, and under that clause Puerto 
__ Rico is administered. During the soon-to-pass 
100 years of the political relationship between 
the United States and Puerto Rico (1898-1998) , 
the representatives of the people of Puerto Rico 
have made innumerable attempts to gain some 
sovereignty. The great majority of our requests 
have been ignored, shelved and disregarded. 
We have also resorted to drastic measures, such 
as armed struggle, which brought repression , 
incarceration and political persecution to those 
who supported independence for Puerto Rico. 
All manner of repression has been employed 
against our movement, including murder. 
The realities we describe herein persist in the 
so called 'Free Associated State ' of Puerto Rico. 
What we have described above has been 
recognised as a colonial relationship by the 
members of the US Congress and by the inter-
national community represented in the United 
Nations. It is for this fact that the UN has passed 
16 resolutions recognising the applicability to 
the people of Puerto Rico of UN Resolution 
1514(XV) and its inalienable right to free deter-
mination and independence. 
For sure the people of East Timor, who have 
sacrificed so many thousands of lives in its 
struggle for independence will not be willing 
to accept any lesser alternative than true 
sovereignty. This sovereignty cannot exist under 
a political system equal to the Free Associated 
State that exists between Puerto Rico and the 
United States. 
September 1997 
Tim or activists in Australia, as well as the actions 
of their government. Rob Wesley-Smith gives a 
graphic account of radio communications with 
the resistance in East Timor during the early 
years of the war. He describes the deliberate 
sabotage of these communications by the 
Australian authorities and the sabotage of a 
mission to take medicine by sea to the isolated 
fighters in East Timor. 
Robert Domm's interview with Xanana 
Gusmao in September 1990 is reproduced in 
full, along with articles by John Pilger and Russell 
Anderson, an eye-witness of the Santa Cruz 
massacre in November 1991. 
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limorese political parties reject 
Indonesia's special status 
Five East Timorese political parties 
have rejected the Indonesian president's 
proposals for autonomy for East Timor 
within Indonesia. The five are 
parties established during the 
decolonisation period initiated by 
Portugal in 1974. Their representatives 
issued the following statement in Dili 
on 11 August 1998. 
Considerations: 
• That the representatives of the five 
undersigned political parties defend the 
fundamental principle of self-determination 
and independence of East Timor; an d 
Indonesia is offering out of charity a form of 
autonomy with in Indonesia which obviously 
could end up as the final solution for East 
Tim or. 
• The three ambassadors from the European 
Union visited East Timor recently and 
approved a joint declaration defending the 
right to the East Timorese people to be 
consulted about the future of their homeland 
and to have a self-determination referendum. 
• Some points agreed between Portugal and 
Indonesia a t the 4-5 August 1998, meeting 
with the United Nation s in New York, 
contributed to a positive movement towards 
a negotiated solu tion to the problem of East 
Timor. 
• That Portugal and Indonesia agreed to discuss 
autonomy of East Timor within Indonesia as 
proposed by Indonesia with the participation 
of East Timorese representatives. 
Statement: 
We, the representatives of the UDT, Fretilin, 
Apodeti , Ko ta and T rabalhista (Labour) Parties, 
within East Timor, state the following: 
l. We completely reject any discussion of East 
Timor being an autonomous province within 
Indonesia as proposed by Indonesia. 
2. v\'e demand Portugal send a committee of 
observers to East Timor to observe the 
situat ion on the spot before entering a 
dialogue and substantiw· discussion with 
Indonesia about the autonomy for East Tim or 
proposed by Indonesia. 
3. We \\ish to go ahead with dialogue under the 
proposal in our joint declaration by UDT, 
Fretilin, Apodeti, Kota and Trabalhista, dated 
25Julv 1998, which follows: 
\\'e completeh· reject the programme proposed 
by the Indonesian Government for East Timor 
to have autonon1\' \\'ithin Indonesia, regardless 
of the form of that autonomy, as this would 
legalise the current integration of East Timor 
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\\~thin Indonesia, which is the result of the illegal 
annexation and military occupation (of East 
Tim orb,· Indonesia) . We demand a referendum 
for the East Timorese people as the only '~ab le 
way to find a final so lution. Therefore we 
propose the following conditions: 
(i) Free the President of National Coun cil of 
Timorese Resistance (CNRT), Kay Raia 
Xanana Gusmao, and all the other East 
Timorese political prisoners. Xanana 
Gusmao 's freedom is an essential condition, 
along with his participation in the dialogu e, 
to finding a solution to the problem of East 
Tim or. 
(ii) The presence of a high commissioner of 
the U nited Nations, with powers to 
participate in identifying and resolving 
problems, starting with con trolling the 
withdrawal of troops, the extinction of the 
practice of physical oppression (of the East 
Timorese people) before the handover of 
powers to a transitional government and 
then to the government chosen by the East 
Timorese people. 
Furthermore 
(iii) The end oflndonesian military operations 
against the civil population as follows: 
(a) End military operations in the whole of 
East Timor. 
(b) Disarm all the East Timorese who have 
been trained and armed as military, 
police, or auxiliaries, and dismantle the 
organisations in which they are involved. 
( c) A ceasefire between Indonesian military 
and Falintil (East Timorese resistance 
army) and Falintil to be allowed to 
occupy a guaran teed neutral zone. 
(d) Formation ofa police body comprising 
Indonesian, Portugal [sic], and CNRT 
(Natio nal Counci l of East Timorese 
Resistance) forces. 
(e) Total withdrawal oflndonesian military 
forces from East Timor. The period of 
execution of all th ese should be 18 
months. 
(iv) Formation of a transitional government 
comprising all political groups in East 
Timor under two high commissioners, one 
from Portugal and the other from 
Indonesia, under the supervision of the 
United Nations, for a period of five years. 
During this period, the following should 
be completed: 
(a) The rehabilitation of all aspects of East 
Timor life. 
(b) Infrastructure development with the 
participation of Portugal and Indonesia. 
( c) Formation of an East Timorese army to 
take the place of the transitional 
tripartite police force. 
(v) Self-determination referendum under the 
supervision of the United Nations, Portugal 
and Indonesia. Finally- to proceed with 
the transfer of powers from the transition-
al government to the government chosen by 
the East Timorese people. 
Signed by: 
Leandro Isaac 
East Timor Regional President, UDT 
(Timorese Democratic Union) 
David Dias Ximenes 
Representative, Fretilin 
Frederico Almeida Santos de Costa 
Executive President, Apodeti 
(Democratic Popular Association of Timor) 
Leao Petro dos Reis Amaral 
President, KOTA 
(Traditional Monarchist Party) 
Paulo Freitas de Silva 
President, Trabalhista (Labour Party) 
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